DBSCAN is a well-known density-based clustering algorithm which offers advantages for finding clusters of arbitrary shapes compared to partitioning and hierarchical clustering methods. However, there are few papers studying the DBSCAN algorithm under the privacy preserving distributed data mining model, in which the data is distributed between two or more parties, and the parties cooperate to obtain the clustering results without revealing the data at the individual parties. In this paper, we address the problem of two-party privacy preserving DBSCAN clustering. We first propose two protocols for privacy preserving DBSCAN clustering over horizontally and vertically partitioned data respectively and then extend them to arbitrarily partitioned data. We also provide analysis of the performance and proof of privacy of our solution.
INTRODUCTION
Consider a scenario in which each hospital has its own database of medical records about patients medical records. If the data from different hospitals can be shared, we can extract more meaningful results than just considering partial data independently. However, since medical records are subject to privacy and confidentially constraints, how to extract the knowledge from the whole data set without revealing one party's data to other parties is the theme of privacy preserv- * This research has been partially funded by the International Science & Technology Cooperation Program of China (2010DFA92720) and Shenzhen Fundamental Research Project (grant no. JC201005270342A).
Techniques from secure multi-party computation [6] form one approach to privacy preserving data mining. Yao's general protocol for secure circuit evaluation [16] can be used, in theory, to solve any two-party privacy preserving distributed data mining problem. However, since data mining usually involves millions or billions of data items, the communication cost of this protocol renders it impractical for these purposes. This has led to the search for problem specific protocols that are efficient in terms of communication complexity. In many cases, including our solution described in this paper, the more efficient solutions still make use of a general solution such as Yao's, but only to carry out a much smaller portion of the computation. The rest of the computation uses other methods to ensure the privacy of the data. A complementary approach to privacy preserving data mining uses randomization techniques [4] . Although such solutions tend to be more efficient than cryptographic solutions, they are generally less private or less accurate.
K-means clustering is a simple technique to group items to K clusters. There are many privacy preserving K-means algorithms [8] [14] . DBSCAN [5] is also a popular densitybased clustering algorithm for discovering clusters in large spatial databases with noise. It is significantly more effective in discovering clusters of arbitrary shape than the partitioning methods such as the well known k-means [12] and CLARANS [11] algorithm as well as hierarchical methods. Similar clustering algorithms based on density are OPTICS [2] , DENCLUE [7] . However, there is little literature considering the problem of privacy preserving distributed distributed density-based clustering. So far [9] is the only work we are aware of but it did not provide adequate privacy as we discuss below.
In [9] , Kumar et al. proposed protocols for the privacy preserving distributed DBSCAN clustering. However, the proofs of privacy of their protocols do not strictly follow the definition of privacy in the semi-honest model [6] . More importantly, it poses significant privacy risks of identifying individual records from other party, a simple example shows that their algorithms do not guarantee the privacy. Considering a scenario like this, Bob has three records B1, B2, B3 and knows one of Alice's record A is in their neighborhood. So Bob could know A is in the intersection of three records' neighborhood (the gray area in Figure 1 ). It could happen that the intersection area is so small that Bob could decide the location of the point A that is not far away from its true location. In this paper, we propose algorithms such that Bob only knows there is a record owned by Alice in B1, B2, B3's neighborhood respectively. However, Bob does not know whether those three records are the same or not. Therefore, Bob can not decide whether there is a record owned by Alice in the small gray region.
In this paper, we present privacy preserving algorithms for DBSCAN clustering for the horizontally, vertically and arbitrarily partitioned data distributed between two parties. We demonstrate that our protocols are efficient in terms of communication, and prove the privacy properties of the protocol.
The main contributions of our paper are:
1. We design a Multiplication Protocol (Subsection 3.1) based on Pailler's Additive Homomorphic crtptosystem.
2. We present privacy preserving distributed DBSCAN clustering protocol utilizing the above multiplication protocol over horizontally (Subsection 3.2), vertically (Subsection 3.3) , and arbitrarily (Subsection 3.4) partitioned data that provide adequate privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some background knowledge that will be used in this paper. The algorithms for computing privacy preserving distributed DBSCAN clustering are given in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper with directions for future work.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly review the DBSCAN clustering algorithm, and describe the concept of horizontally, vertically and arbitrarily partitioned data. Some definitions borrowed from cryptology, and two protocols that will be used in this paper are also given.
DBSCAN Algorithm
We briefly review the DBSCAN (Density Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise) algorithm. Details are described in [5] . DBSCAN is a density-based algorithm which can detect arbitrary shaped clusters. The key idea is that for each point of a cluster, the neighborhood of which within a given radius (Eps) has to contain at least a minimum number (MinPts) of points, i.e. the density in the neighborhood has to exceed some threshold. Therefore, the critical step in this algorithm is to decide whether the distance between two points is less than or equal to Eps. It is an easy task if two points are owned by one party. Otherwise, we need to develop a private protocol to compute the distance between two points that are owned by two parties.
We illustrate several Definitions in DBSCAN algorithm [5] that will be used in the next Section. 
Partitioned Data
In the two-party distributed data setting, two parties (call them Alice and Bob) hold data forming a (virtual) database consisting of their joint data. More specifically, the virtual database D = {d1, d2, ..., dn} consists of n records. Each record di has m values for m attributes (di,1, di,2, ..., di,m).
There are three formats for partitioned data:
• Horizontally Partitioned Data: each party owns different records with full attributes (see Figure 2 ).
• Vertically Partitioned Data: each party owns all records with partial attributes (see Figure 3 ).
• Arbitrarily Partitioned Data [8] : mixture of horizontally and vertically partitioned data (see Figure 4 ). 
Data owned by Alice Data owned by Bob Figure 3 : Vertically partitioned data.
Privacy Properties
Our desired outcome is that clusters are computed on Alice and Bob's joint data. Alice should learn the cluster number (or the NOISE data record, that some records do not belong to any clusters) for each data record that she owns completely, and Bob should learn the cluster number (or the NOISE data record) for each data object that he owns completely. For records that are split between Alice and Bob, they should both learn the cluster number.
In an ideal world, Alice and Bob would have access to a trusted third party who could perform the necessary calculations. Alice and Bob would securely send their data to this trusted party, which would then compute the cluster to which each object is assigned using the appropriate clustering algorithm, and send the desired information to the party that owns the object. However, trusted third parties are hard to find in the real world, and even then, such trust may be misplaced. In this work, we do not rely on a third party. Instead, we provide protocols by which Alice and Bob can carry out the functionality that would be provided by the trusted third party without actually requiring such third party or requiring the parties to send their data to each other.
Two-party Computation
A two-party protocol problem [6] is casted by specifying a random process that maps pairs of inputs to pairs of outputs (one for each party). We refer to such a process as a functionality and denote it as f : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * , where f = (f1, f2). That is, for every pair of inputs (x, y), the output pair is a random variable (f1(x, y), f2(x, y)) ranging over pairs of strings. The first party (with input x) wishes to obtain f1(x, y) and the second party (with input y) wishes to obtain f2(x, y). We often denote such a functionality by (x, y) → (f1(x, y), f2(x, y)).
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Figure 4: Arbitrarily partitioned data =vertically partitioned data + horizontally partitioned data.
Semi-honest
In any multi-party computation setting, a malicious adversary can always alter its input. In the data mining setting, this fact can be very damaging since the adversary can define its input to be the empty database. Then the output obtained is the result of the algorithm on the other party ֒ aŕs database alone. Although this attack cannot be prevented, we would like to prevent a malicious party from executing any other attack. However, for this initial work we assume that the adversary is semi-honest [6] (also known as passive). That is, it correctly follows the protocol specification, yet attempts to learn additional information by analyzing the transcript of messages received during the execution. We remark that although the semi-honest adversarial model is far weaker than the malicious model (where a party may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol specification), it is often a realistic one. This is because deviating from a specified program which may be buried in a complex application is a non-trivial task. Semi-honest adversarial behavior also models a scenario in which both parties that participate in the protocol are honest. However, following the protocol execution, an adversary may obtain a transcript of the protocol execution by breaking into one of the parties' machines.
Definition of Privacy in the Semi-honest Model
Intuitively, a protocol is private if whatever can be computed by a party participating in the protocol can be computed based on its input and output only. This is formalized according to the simulation paradigm. Loosely speaking, we require that a party's view in a protocol execution be simulative given only its input and output. This then implies that the parties learn nothing from the protocol execution itself, as desired.
We begin with the following notations:
• Let f = (f1, f2) be a probabilistic, polynomial-time functionality and let be a two-party protocol for computing f .
• The view of the first (resp., second) party during an execution of on (x, y), denoted by view 1 (x, y)(resp., view 2 (x, y)), is (x, r 1 , m (resp., r 2 ) represents the outcome of the first (resp., second) party ֒ aŕs internal coin tosses, and m 1 i (resp., m 2 i ) represents the ith message it has received.
• The output of the first (resp., second) party during an execution of on (x, y) is denoted by output 1 (x, y) (resp., output 2 (x, y)), and is implicit in the party ֒ aŕs view of the execution.
Definition 3. Privacy with Respect to Semi-Honest Behavior
For a functionality f , we say that privately computes f if there exist probabilistic polynomial time algorithms, denoted by S1 and S2, such that
where c ≡ denotes computational indistinguishability.
Equations 1 and 2 state that the view of a party can be simulated by a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm given access to the party's input and output only. We emphasize that the adversary here is semi-honest and therefore the view is exactly according to the protocol definition. See [6] for a full discussion. [3] : Suppose that g is privately reducible to f and that there exists a protocol for privately computing f . Then there exists a protocol for privately computing g.
Theorem 1. (Composition Theorem for the semi-honest model, two parties)

Paillier's Additive Homomorphic Properties
For some notations will be used in Subsection 3.1, we briefly describe the Paillier's additive homomorphic cryptosystem [13] and its homomorphic properties which will be used in our protocols.
Key generation
• Choose two large prime numbers p and q randomly and independently of each other such that gcd(pq, (p − 1)(q − 1)) = 1.
• Compute n = pq and λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1).
• Select random integer g where g ∈ Z * n 2 .
• Ensure n divides the order of g by checking the existence of the following modular multiplicative inverse:
• The public encryption key is (n, g) and private decryption key is (λ, u).
Encryption
• Let m be a plaintext to be encrypted where m ∈ Zn.
• Select random r where r ∈ Z * n .
• Compute ciphertext as: c = g m r n mod n 2 .
Homomorphic properties • Homomorphic addition of plaintexts:
D(E(m1, r1)E(m2, r2) mod n 2 ) = (m1 + m2) mod n
• Homomorphic multiplication of plaintexts:
Yao's Millionaires' Problem Protocol (YMPP)
Alice has i millions and Bob has j millions, where 1 < i, j < n ′ and n ′ is the limit value of i, j. Yao's millionaires' problem [15] decide whether i < j, such that this is also the only thing they know in the end. The protocol is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Yao's Millionaires' Problem Protocol
Input:Alice inputs i, Bob inputs j. Output:Alice and Bob know whether i < j and can not get any more information about the wealth of the other party.
1: Bob picks a random N -bits integer, and computes privately the value of Ea(x); call the result k. 2: Bob sends Alice the number k − j + 1; 3: Alice computes privately the values of yu = Da(k−j +u) for u = 1, 2, ..., n ′ . 4: Alice generates a random prime p of N/2 bits, and computes the values zu = yu(mod p) for all u; if all zu differ by at least 2 in the mod p sense, stop; otherwise generates another random prime and repeat the process until all zu differ by at least 2; let p, zu denote this final set of numbers; 5: Alice sends the prime p and the following n ′ numbers to B : z1, z2, ..., zi followed by zi + 1, zi+1 + 1, ..., z n ′ + 1; the above numbers should be interpreted in the mod p sense. 6: Bob looks at the j-th number (not counting p) sent from Alice, and decides that i ≥ j if it is equal to x mod p, and i < j otherwise. 7: Bob tells Alice what the conclusion is.
PRIVACY PRESERVING DISTRIBUTED DBSCAN CLUSTERING
In this section, we first introduce our multiplication protocol, then extend the single party DBSCAN algorithm of [5] to privacy preserving distributed DBSCAN clustering on horizontally vertically and arbitrary partitioned data, respectively. We also provide analysis of the communication complexity and proofs of privacy of our protocols.
Multiplication Protocol
Multiplication problem can be described as: Alice inputs private number x and Bob inputs private number y, Alice (but not Bob) is to get the result u = xy + v, where v is a random number known only to Bob. Alice should not be able to derive the value of y from u and the execution of the protocol. Similarly Bob should not be able to get the result of xy or the value of x.
Multiplication problem is a special case of scalar products problem, but the known scalar products protocols are not fit for the multiplication problem. In our method, Paillier's additive homomorphic encryption schemes [13] 
Correctness proof
Since,
Based on the Pallier's homomorphic properties,
Proof. We start by presenting a simulator for the Alice's view. In the protocol, the only information Alice received from Bob is the u ′ in Step 6. Alice can simulate the y and v by y ′ and v ′ generated from a single random number with uniform random distribution. That is, on Alice's view, the simulated view (EA(x, r))
is computationally indistinguishable from the u ′ that Alice had received in Step 6.
We now turn to the Bob's view. Bob receives an encryption key EA and a encrypted value EA(x). Bob can simulate the encryption key by generating a single random number from a uniform random distribution and the encrypted value can also be simulated simply by generating a random from an uniform distribution.
The simulator for both runs in linear time, which meets the requirement of a polynomial time simulation.
Privacy Preserving Distributed DBSCAN Clustering over Horizontally Partitioned Data
Distance protocol for horizontally partitioned data. We first present a distance protocol (HDP) for evaluating the distance between two horizontally split records. Consider the horizontally partitioned data as shown in Figure  2 . Let dy (l + 1 ≤ y ≤ n) denote one record of Bob and dx (1 ≤ x ≤ l) denote one record of Alice. Proof. Besides the protocol YMPP, the only communication is Alice sends r1, r2, ..., rm to Bob. On Bob's view, he could simulate the r 
DBSCAN Algorithm for Horizontally Partitioned Data
The details of the DBSCAN algorithm for horizontally partitioned data are given in Algorithm 3. SetOfPointsOfAlice (SetOfPointsOfBob) is either the complete database of Alice's (Bob's) or a discovered cluster from a previous run of Alice (Bob) . Eps and MinPts are the global density parameters. A call of SetOfPointsOfAlice.regionQuery(PointOfAlice, Eps) (SetOfPointsOfBob.regionQuery(PointOfBob,Eps)) returns the Eps-Neighborhood of PointOfAlice (PointOfBob) in SetOfPointsOfAlice (SetOfPointsOfBob) as a list of points. The function SetOfPointsOfAlice.get(i) (SetOfPointsOfBob. get(i)) returns the i-th element of SetOfPointsOfAlice (SetOfPointsOfBob). The most important function used by DB-SCAN is ExpandCluster which is presented in Algorithm 4. SetOfPointsOfBobPermutation (SetOfPointsOfAlicePermutation) is SetOfPointsOfBob (SetOfPointsOfAlice). But in each iteration, the points' order is permutated randomly. Therefore, Alice (Bob) only knows there is a point of Bob (Alice) (but does not know which point of Bob (Alice)) in neighborhood of one of her (his) points. In this way, the situation in Figure 1 can be avoided. What should be noted is that in Step 3 and 13, only Alice (Bob) knows whether the point in SetOfPointsOfBobPermutation (SetOfPointsOfAlicePermutation) is seed or not. Otherwise, Bob (Alice) could decide Alice (Bob) in a small intersection region as we argued in Figure 1 .
Communication Complexity and Privacy
For each record di (1 ≤ i ≤ n), it has m components. Let us assume that each component is represented by c1 bits. Communication is involved when the two parties engage in the Multiplication Protocol to judge the core point. The communication complexity of each Multiplication Protocol is O(c1). Let us assume that each number in protocol YMPP is represented by c2 bits. Hence it requires a communication of O(c1ml(n−l)+c2n ′ l(n−l)) bits to execute the algorithm, where n ′ = |u| and l is the number of records owned by one party. 
Proof.
Step 3 and Step 13 are the only steps of Algorithm 4 requiring communication. As Lemma 2 has proved, protocol HDP is private. Applying the composition theorem (Theorem 1), we can conclude that the privacy preserving distributed DBSCAN clustering over horizontally partitioned data is private.
While not truly zero-knowledge for the number of points from the other party in the neighborhood of this point is revealed, it reduces the confidence of the leaked knowledge of the exact points. In practical terms, revealing the number is likely to be of little concern.
Privacy Preserving Distributed DBSCAN Clustering over Vertically Partitioned Data
Distance protocol for vertically partitioned data. We first present a distance protocol (VDP) for evaluating the distance between two vertically split records. Consider the vertically partitioned data as shown in Figure 3 . 
Bob obtained
then use protocol YMPP, Alice and Bob could decide whether dist(dx, dy) ≤ Eps or not. 
DBSCAN Algorithm for Vertically Partitioned Data
Communication Complexity and Privacy
For each record di, it has m components. Communication is involved when the two parties engage in the protocol YMPP to judge the core point. Let us assume that each number in protocol YMPP is represented by c2 bits. Proof. The key privacy of the algorithm 6 is the comparison of dist(dx, dy) with Eps. This is guaranteed by protocol YMPP. Applying the composition theorem (Theorem 1), we can conclude that the privacy preserving distributed DB-SCAN clustering over vertically partitioned data is secure. The only information revealed is the output which must be known by Alice and Bob.
While not truly zero-knowledge for the number of points in the neighborhood of this point is revealed, it reduces the confidence of the leaked knowledge of the exact points. In practical terms, revealing the number is likely to be of little concern.
Privacy Preserving Distributed DBSCAN Clustering Algorithm over Arbitrarily Partitioned Data
In arbitrarily partitioned data, there is not necessarily a simple pattern of how data are shared between the parties. For each record di (1 ≤ i ≤ n), Alice knows the values for a subset of the attributes, and Bob knows the values for the remaining attributes. That is, each di is partitioned into disjoint subsets Alice d i and Bob d i such that Alice knows Alice d i and Bob knows Bob d i . Although extremely patchworked data is unlikely in practice, the generality of this model can make it better suited to practical settings in which data may be mostly, but not completely, vertically or horizontally partitioned.
As discussed in subsection 2.1, the key of DBSCAN is to judge dist{di, dj } ≤ Eps for two records dx, dy owned by Alice and Bob, respectively. For example, in Figure 4 , the problem is to let Alice and Bob cooperate to decide For the vertically partitioned data, (A2,1 −A1,1) 2 = Alicev is owned by Alice and (B2,2 − B1,2) 2 = Bobv is owned by Bob. For the horizontally partitioned data, we could process them using the protocol HDP. That is, the horizontally partitioned data could divide to data owned by Alice (Alice h ) and data owned by Bob (Bob h ). Then Alice and Bob use protocol HDP to let Bob get (B2,3 − A1, 3) 2 + (B2,4 − A1,4) 2 = Bob h . Together with Bobv, Bob knows Bob h + Bobv. Since Alice knows Alicev, Alice and Bob could decide dist{di, dj } ≤ Eps by using protocol YMPP.
Due to limited space, we do not present the detailed algorithm for arbitrarily partitioned data. However, it should be easy to figure out the algorithm for the arbitrarily partitioned data based on the algorithms for horizontally and vertically partitioned data.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we provide efficient privacy preserving algorithms for DBSCAN clustering over the setting of horizontally, vertically and arbitrarily partitioned data, respectively. However, in order to decide whether one point is core point, our method reveals the number of points from the other party in the neighborhood of this point. In the future, we want to develop the algorithms of deciding whether one point is core point without knowing the number of points from the other party in the neighborhood of this point. Also, it will be interesting to see whether we can extend our method to other privacy preserving distributed data mining algorithms.
